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ARTICLES
OPTIMAL DYNAMIC LABOR
TAXATION
PARANTAP BASU
University of Durham
THOMAS I. RENSTRO¨M
University of Durham
and
CEPR
We analyze optimal dynamic taxation when labor supply is indivisible. As in Hansen
(1985) and Rogerson (1988), markets are complete, and an employment lottery
determines who works. The consumer can buy insurance to diversify this income
uncertainty. The optimal wage tax is generally positive except for some special cases
when leisure is nonnormal and the government can use debt as a policy instrument in
addition to its tax instruments. We derive a HARA class of preferences, for which we
characterize the dynamic paths of the wage tax. The optimal paths of the labor tax differ
between divisible- and indivisible-labor economies.
Keywords: Optimal Taxation, Dynamic Taxation, Indivisible Labor
1. INTRODUCTION
There are two ways of introducing second-best government policy in a competitive
economy. The first is when the government has to raise an exogenously specified
amount of revenue without recourse to lump-sum taxation. The second-best tax
system then minimizes the distortions.1 The second alternative is to highlight
the redistributive role of the government when individuals are heterogeneous in
terms of factor ownership. The government then resorts to distortionary taxation
for redistributive reasons. Under both approaches, considerable research has been
devoted to finding the optimal capital-income tax. The central result is typically
that the optimal capital-income tax is zero in the steady state. This is the well-
known Judd-Chamley result [Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986)].2
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In this paper, we focus our attention on analyzing the second-best labor income
taxation in the Judd-Chamley model. The goal of our paper is to find conditions on
preferences that give rise to positive labor taxation.3 We do this in a fairly general
setting, which includes physical capital and public debt, and allows for both capital
and labor to be taxed.4 The issue is important because one may question whether
the labor income tax is also zero in the steady state like the capital tax. If the
government can accumulate capital, it could raise all necessary revenues by taxing
capital and labor at the beginning of the optimization period, and set all taxes zero
at the steady state.5 Renstro¨m (1999) investigates this issue in an economy with
divisible labor, and finds that the labor tax is positive in the steady state if leisure
is normal. In this paper, we allow labor supply to be indivisible, as in Hansen
(1985) and Rogerson (1988), and we establish conditions not only for positive
labor taxation but also for zero and negative taxation.6,7
Why is the issue of optimal taxation in an environment with indivisible labor
worth exploring? With indivisible labor, we can unravel a rich set of preferences for
which labor is taxable. We accomplish this by establishing a connection between
the household’s demand for unemployment insurance and the normality of leisure.
When leisure is normal, in order to raise the tax base, the fiscal authority would
tax labor to induce the household to work harder. When labor supply is indivisible,
and the leisure is normal, the individual buys insurance to equate the utility gain
from not working to the utility cost of the insurance purchase. The novelty of our
approach is that we further derive a HARA class of preferences (i.e., preferences
with Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion) with nonseparable leisure for which
this insurance is a linear function of after-tax wage income. Because positive
insurance demand and normality of leisure are inextricably connected, one can
then answer the tax policy question posed in this paper: What class of preferences
would warrant positive labor taxation? For those preferences, we can derive the
time path of the optimal labor tax. In addition, we can compare the optimal time
paths of labor income taxes between divisible and indivisible labor economies,
which turn out to be very different between these two scenarios. This happens
because labour supply elasticities are different between these two models.
There is also a pedagogical reason for exploring the optimal labor taxation in
an indivisible labor scenario. There is a literature on optimal taxation arguing
that labor should be taxed when market is incomplete in the sense that there is
neither an insurance market nor a set of contingent-claims markets (where the
household can diversify income risk). The government then uses corrective taxes
for the missing markets.8 However, the issue still remains whether labor should
be taxed in a complete-markets environment. Our exercise with indivisible labor
provides insights why labor may be taxed even when there are no missing insurance
markets.9
We also characterize the short-run dynamics of the labor income tax. We find
that when leisure is normal, the optimal labor tax is increasing over time as long
as capital is taxed. When leisure is inferior, and labor is subsidized, the subsidy is
increasing over time as long as capital is taxed. We also look at two special cases
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of the HARA class, iso-elastic utility and negative exponential utility. We find that
for widely used iso-elastic preferences, the optimal labor income tax is positive
both in the short and long run. For negative exponential utility, where leisure is
neutral, the optimal labor-income tax is zero in the short and long run when the
government can use debt as an instrument. Optimal taxation of labor is, therefore,
generally positive except for some special types of preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the model.
Section 3 derives the optimal-tax implications in a second-best world. Section 4
derives a class of HARA preferences, and presents examples of the time path of
the optimal labor tax. Section 5 compares the time paths of optimal taxes between
divisible and indivisible labor economies. Section 6 briefly discusses the case
when public debt is zero. Section 7 concludes.
2. AN ECONOMY WITH INDIVISIBLE LABOR
2.1. Individual Economic Behavior
Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), we consider an economy where
labor supply is indivisible. The consumption set is restricted so that that the individ-
uals can work either full time, h0, or not at all. Households have access to an insur-
ance market where they can buy insurance. In each period, the household member
engages in an employment lottery, choosing the probability of working, α(t), and
the probability of not working, (1−α(t)). This makes her wage income uncertain.
She has access to an insurance market where she buys unemployment insurance,
y(t).The household’s consumption (cs(t)) and asset accumulation (a˙s(t)) are thus
potentially contingent on whether the household works (s = 1) or not (s = 2).
There is no intrinsic uncertainty, which means that preferences and technology are
nonstochastic. The household thus solves the following maximization problem:
J (a0) ≡ max
c,y,α
∫ ∞
0
e−θt [α(t)u(c1(t), 1 − h0) + (1 − α(t))u(c2(t), 1)] dt (1)
a˙1(t) = ρ(t)a(t) + ω(t)h0 − p(α(t))y(t) − c1(t) (2)
a˙2(t) = ρ(t)a(t) + y(t) − p(α(t))y(t) − c2(t) (3)
a(0) = a0, (4)
where a(t) equals the sum of outstanding public debt, b(t), and the capital stock,
k(t), that earn the after-tax interest at rate ρ(t)= (1 − τK(t))r(t), and ω(t)=
(1− τL(t))w(t) is the after tax wage; r(t) and w(t) are the rental- and wage-rates,
respectively, τK(t) and τL(t) are the proportional tax rates on capital- and labor-
income, respectively, and p(α(t)) is the competitive price of insurance.10 The
insurance company behaves competitively and maximizes the expected profit,
p(α(t))y(t) − (1 − α(t))y(t), which gives rise to the zero-profit condition,
p(α(t)) = 1 − α(t).11
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Substituting the zero-profit condition into (2) and (3), the current value
Hamiltonian of the representative household can be written as
H = α(t)u(c1(t), 1 − h0) + (1 − α(t))u(c2(t), 1)
+α(t)q1(t)[ρ(t)a(t) + ω(t)h0 − (1 − α(t)y(t) − c1(t)]
+ (1 − α(t))q2(t)[ρ(t)a(t) + α(t)y(t) − c2(t)]. (5)
The first-order conditions are (subscripts denoting partial derivatives)
∂H
∂c1(t)
= uc(c1(t), 1 − h0) − q1(t) = 0 (6)
∂H
∂c2(t)
= uc(c2(t), 1) − q2(t) = 0 (7)
∂H
∂y(t)
= q1(t) − q2(t) = 0. (8)
Using (6), (7), and (8) it follows that
uc(c
1(t), 1 − h0) = uc(c2(t), 1) = q(t), (9)
which means perfect insurance. In other words, by buying insurance, the individual
equalizes the marginal utilities across states. Equation (9) gives the optimal time
paths of state-contingent consumption, c1(q(t)) and c2(q(t)), as functions of the
co-state variable q(t). However, this does not necessarily imply that household will
equalize consumption across states. For consumption equalization, one requires
an additional restriction on the preferences that the utility function is additively
separable between consumption and leisure, meaning uc(1−h) = 0. It turns out that
without any such restriction on the preferences, the household will not choose to
have full consumption insurance as in Hansen (1985).12 This can be seen from
(6), (7), and (8). Because 1 − h0 is not equal to unity, c1 cannot equal c2 unless
uc(1−h) is equal to 0. Next, because q1(t) = q2(t) it follows that the optimal asset
holding decisions must satisfy
a˙1(t) = a˙2(t), (10a)
q˙(t) = (θ − ρ(t))q(t). (10b)
An individual’s asset accumulation is thus independent of her employment
history. This implies that individuals starting with the same a0 will have the same
a(t) at all t , regardless of their employment history. Substituting (10a) in (2) and
(3) gives
y(t) = ω(t)h0 + c2(q(t)) − c1(q(t)). (11)
Notice now that the household chooses full insurance if the optimal consumption
bundles are such that c1(q(t))= c2(q(t)). In the absence of any restriction on y(t),
OPTIMAL DYNAMIC LABOR TAXATION 571
the household can choose to have positive, negative or zero insurance.13 Finally,
the optimal choice of α(t) must be such that
∂H
∂α(t)
= u(c1(q(t)), 1 − h0) − u(c2(q(t)), 1)
− q(t)[c1(q(t)) − c2(q(t)) − ω(t)h0] = 0, (12)
which upon the use of (11) can be rewritten as
u(c2(q(t)), 1) − u(c1(q(t)), 1 − h0) = q(t)y(t). (12′)
The household chooses to buy a positive insurance, y(t), if the utility gain from
not working balances the utility cost of the insurance purchase.
2.2. Production
There is large number of competitive firms in the economy each operating under
the following constant returns-to-scale technology:
f (k(t), α(t)h0) = f1 · k(t) + f2 · α(t)h0, (13)
where f1 = ∂f∂k and f2 = ∂f∂αh0 .
2.3. The Government
The government taxes labor and capital income to finance an exogenously specified
sequence of public spending, g(t), the use of which is not explicitly modeled. It
adjusts two tax rates, τL(t) and τK(t), continuously. The government is assumed
to borrow and lend freely at the market rate of interest, r(t). The government’s
budget constraint is, therefore, given by
.
b = r(t)b(t) − τ k(t)r(t)a(t) − τL(t)w(t)α(t)h0 + g(t), (14)
with b(0) = b0.
2.4. Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions:
(a) Facing w(t), r(t), τL(t), τK(t), the household chooses optimal sequences of c(t),
a(t), α(t),y(t) that solves the problem stated in (1), (2) and (3).14
(b) Given an exogenous steam of government spending, g(t), the government precommits
to a tax sequence, τL(t) and τK(t), and a debt sequence, b(t), that satisfies the
government budget constraint (14).
(c) Goods, labor, rental markets clear meaning
k˙(t) = f (k(t), α(t)h0) − α(t)c1(t) − [1 − α(t)]c2(t) − g(t), (15)
ω(t) = (1 − τL(t))f2(k(t), α(t)h0), (16)
ρ(t) = (1 − τK(t))f1(k(t), α(t)h0). (17)
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Notice that the equilibrium level of employment, h(t) (≡ α(t)h0) is determined
by the time path of the probability of work, α(t). The equilibrium time path of
α(t) can be determined in two steps. First, using (12) one determines the market
clearing after tax wage, ω(t) as a function of q(t). Define that equilibrium wage
function as
ω(t) = (q(t)). (18)
Next, using (16) and (18), one can characterize the path of α(t) as a function of
k(t), q(t), and τL(t) as follows:
α(t) = α(k(t), τL(t), q(t)) (19)
PROPOSITION 1. In equilibrium, y(t) > 0, if and only if ∂α(t)
∂a0
< 0 (leisure is
normal at date t); y(t) < 0, if and only if ∂α(t)
∂a0
> 0 (leisure is inferior at date t).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Positive insurance demand and normality of leisure are inextricably
connected.15 To see the intuition, start from a scenario where the initial wealth,
a0 is such that y(t)= 0. In this case, the individual is indifferent between work
and no work (see Equation 12′). Starting from this scenario suppose a0 increases.
A higher wealth makes the consumer value leisure more if leisure is normal. The
household cannot choose hours of work in this indivisible labor world. The only
choice is to decrease the probability of work and buy positive insurance in response
to increase in wealth. This is why a positive insurance demand is associated with
a positive utility gain from not working as in (12′).16
3. SECOND-BEST OPTIMAL TAXATION
We now solve for the optimal tax problem for the government for this economy
with indivisible labor. The government solves a Ramsey problem for precommitted
tax sequences, τL(t) and τK(t), that maximize the household’s utility functional
(1) subject to its own budget constraint (14), the economy wide resource constraint
(15), the first-order optimality conditions (9), (10b), and (12), and a no-confiscation
constraint on capital income as follows:17
ρ(t) ≥ 0. (20)
Using (16) and (17), and the CRS property of the production function, the
government’s budget constraint, (14), can be rewritten as
b˙(t) = ρ(t)b(t) + ρ(t)k(t) + α(t)ω(t)h0 − f (k(t), α(t)h0) + g(t). (21)
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We may write the government’s current value Hamiltonian as follows (ignoring
the time indices from now on):
Hg = αu(c1, 1 − h0) + (1 + α)u(c2, 1)
+µ{ρb + ρk + αωh0 − f (k, αh0) + g}
+ λ{f (k, αh0) − αc1 − (1 − α)c2 − g} + ψ(θ − ρ)q + νρ. (22)
In principle, the government faces the states, k, b, and q, and chooses the
controls ρ and τL. For algebraic convenience, we pose the government’s problem
as follows. The government chooses the controls ρ and α. Then using the equi-
librium sequence of α as in (19), one can determine the optimal labor tax, τL.18
Denoting u1 = u(c1,1−h0) and u2 = u(c2,1), the first-order conditions facing the
government are as follows:
∂Hg
∂α
= u1 − u2 + µ[ωh0 − f2 · h0] + λ[f2h0 + c2 − c1] = 0 (23)
∂Hg
∂q
= −ψ˙ + θψ
⇒ ψ˙ = ρψ − αu1cc1q − (1 − α)u2cc2q − µα′(q)h0 + λ
[
αc1q + (1 − α)c2q
]
(24)
∂Hg
∂ρ
= µ(b + k) − ψq + ν = 0 (25)
∂Hg
∂k
= µ(ρ − f1) + λf1 = θλ − λ˙ (26)
∂Hg
∂b
= µρ = θµ − µ˙. (27)
3.1. The Optimal Capital-Income Tax
One may now establish, as in Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), that the optimal
capital-income tax is zero in the steady state, also in our economy with indivisible
labor. This can be verified as follows. At steady state the individual’s marginal
utility of consumption is constant over time, implying, by (10b), that θ = ρ. This
in turn implies, by (27), that µ is constant in the steady state. With µ being
constant (and q constant), equation (23) implies that also λ is constant in the
steady state. Setting the time derivative of λ to zero in (26), and using θ = ρ gives
(ρ − f1)(λ−µ) = 0, which holds if and only if f1 = ρ because (λ−µ) > 0. We
summarize this result in terms of the following proposition.
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PROPOSITION 2. If the indivisible labor economy converges to a steady state
under the second-best tax program, then in the steady state the optimal capital-
income tax is zero, τK = 0.
3.2. The Optimal Labor-Income Tax
Our primary interest in this paper is to explore carefully the optimal labor-tax
implications. The problem is complicated by the fact that in an economy with in-
divisible labor and lottery, the consumer has the option to transfer consumption not
only across dates but also across states. Whether the government should tax wage
income in the second best depends crucially on the household’s risk preference,
which will determine its demand for insurance. The following proposition states
a key result about the relationship between the household’s demand for insurance
and the second-best wage taxation.
PROPOSITION 3. Under the second-best tax program, from the date when the
no-confiscation constraint (20) on capital ceases to bind, the optimal wage-income
tax is positive (negative) if the household’s demand for insurance, y, is positive
(negative).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus, there is a direct link between the sign of y and the sign of the labor-
income tax. The question arises whether the optimal labor-income tax is zero
when y = 0, the case when leisure is neutral. This cannot be directly inferred
from Proposition 3, because it is based on an equilibrium wage equation subject
to the condition that y is nonzero.19 We next analyze a benchmark case when the
optimal labor income tax is zero.
PROPOSITION 4. If the preferences of the consumer are such that the con-
sumer chooses to buy zero insurance (meaning y = 0), the optimal labor-income
tax is zero at all dates.
Proof. Plugging (12′) into (23) and using (11), one obtains
f2 − ω = (q − λ)y
(λ − µ)h0 . (29)
It immediately follows that when y = 0, f2 = ω, which means τL = 0.
Because Proposition 1 gave us a one-to-one relationship between normal-
ity/neutrality/inferiority of leisure and positive/zero/negative insurance, we can
conclude from Propositions 3 and 4 that there is a one-to-one relationship be-
tween normality/neutrality/inferiority of leisure and the sign of the optimal la-
bor tax. That is, the labor tax should be positive/zero/negative if leisure in nor-
mal/neutral/inferior. Notice that this is not just a steady-state result but holds at
least from date when the nonconfiscation constraint does not bind.
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The issue arises whether for normal/inferior leisure, the labor-income
tax/subsidy rises or falls over time. It is difficult to characterize the exact time
path without fully specifying the preferences. In the next section, we derive a
broad class of HARA preferences for which it is possible to characterize the exact
short run path of the labor tax.
4. DYNAMICS OF THE LABOR TAX: A PARAMETRIC EXAMPLE
Consider a class of preferences for which insurance demand is proportional to the
wage income as follows:
y = (1 − π)ω h0, (30)
where π is a parameter that can be either positive, negative, or zero. It turns out
that the parameter π pins down alternative preference structures for which leisure
may be normal, neutral or inferior.
4.1. Full Insurance
The benchmark case of full insurance arises π = 0. We have the following result.
PROPOSITION 5. Necessary and sufficient for π = 0 is that the utility func-
tion u (c, 1 − h0) is additively separable in leisure: uc(1−h) = 0.
Proof. If π = 0, from (11) and (30) it follows that c1 = c2. Next, note that
when c1 = c2, the only way marginal utilities can be equalized in (9) is by setting
uc(1−h) = 0. This proves necessity. Next we prove the sufficiency. If uc(1−h) = 0,
the = from (9) it follows that c1 = c2, which on plugging in (11) and (30) gives
π = 0.
The additive separable leisure in the utility function is widely used in the
literature. When the utility function is additively separable in leisure, it implies that
leisure is a normal good. In this case, evidently labor is taxed as per Proposition 2.
However, the converse is not true. For normality of leisure, it is not necessary that
uc(1−h)v = 0. We now derive a wide range of preferences involving nonseparable
leisure that belongs to a family of preferences known as the Hyperbolic Absolute
Risk Aversion (HARA) class. Such a family of preferences can be derived when
π = 0.
4.2. HARA Preferences
We shall establish now that for π = 0, the derived HARA class can encompass
various possibilities: (a) 0 <π < 1, partial insurance; (b) π = 1 no insurance;
(c) π > 1, negative insurance, and (d) π < 0, over-insurance.
Plugging (30) into (11) to eliminate ω, we get
y = 1 − π
π
(c1 − c2). (31)
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Plugging (31) into (12′) gives
u1 − u2 + q 1 − π
π
(c1(q) − c2(q)) = 0, (32)
where u1 = u(c1(q), 1 − h0) and u2 = u(c2(q), 1). Equation (32) holds for all
preferences for which π = 0.20 We wish to find the class of preferences for which
π is constant (i.e., independent of q). We have the following lemma.
LEMMA 1. It is necessary that the class of preferences for which π = 0, sat-
isfies the following condition:
u1c c
1
q −u2c c2q +(1 − π)(c1 − c2) = 0, (33)
where usc and csq denote the derivatives of u and c in state s = {1, 2} w.r.t. c and
q, respectively.
Proof. Define (32) as the implicit function J (q, π)= 0. Using the implicit
function theorem,
∂π
∂q
= − Jq
Jπ
. (34)
For (34) to be zero, it is necessary that either Jq = 0 or Jπ = ∞. However,
Jπ = ∞ would mean
−q(c1 − c2)/π2 = ∞, (35)
q being the marginal utility of consumption cannot be infinity at the optimum.
Thus, for (35) to hold, π must equal zero, which violates the restriction that π = 0.
Thus, it is necessary that Jq =0, which yields (33).
LEMMA 2. For Jq = 0 ∀ q, it is necessary that the utility function is of the
following Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) form:
u(cs, 1 − hs) = Ds − B
s
π
(A + (1 − π) cs )π/(π−1), (36)
for s = {1, 2}. Bs and Ds are constants (possibly dependent of h), with B > 0,
and A is a constant independent of h.
Proof. Taking the derivative of (9) w.r.t. q gives csq(q)= 1/uscc, s ={1, 2}.
Plugging this into (33), we get
u1c
u1cc
+ (1 − π) c1 = u
2
c
u2cc
+ (1 − π) c2. (37)
Because preferences are state independent (i.e., expected utility), the left- and
right-hand sides must equal the same constant, (say −A), that is,
usc
uscc
= −A − (1 − π) cs, (38)
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for s = {1, 2}. This means that A and π cannot be state dependent (i.e., dependent
of h). Integrating (38) twice (see, Appendix C for derivation) yields (36).
We next show that for the class of HARA preferences (36), the constant D is
state independent (i.e., independent of leisure).
LEMMA 3. For (32) and (36) to hold, it is necessary that that D1 = D2.
Proof. Take the derivative of (36)
uc(c
s, 1 − hs) = Bs(A + (1 − π) cs )1/(π−1) . (39)
Then, by using (9), we find cs as functions of q:
cs = 1
1 − π
(
q
Bs
)π−1
− A
π − 1 . (40)
Inserting (40) into (36) gives
us = Ds − (Bs )1−π qπ /π. (41)
Plugging (40) and (41) into (32), it follows that D1 = D2.
Because in the preference class (36), only Bs and cs can be state-dependent, it
must be the case that Bs is a function of leisure. Using this insight, define Bs =φh,
where h can take two possible states 0 and h0. Our next task is to characterize
the precise restrictions on π , which generates leisure as a “good” (with positive
marginal utility) in the utility function. We are ready to state a key proposition.
PROPOSITION 6. Necessary and sufficient for insurance to be a constant
fraction of the after-tax wage income is that the preferences belong to the following
class:
u(c, 1 − h) = D − φ
h
π
(A + (1 − π)c )π/(π−1), (42)
where A and D are constants. φh is a function of leisure as follows:
(a) If π > 0, then φh = φ(h), with φ(h0) > φ(0).
(b) If π < 0, then φh = φ(1 − h), with φ(1) > φ(1 − h0).
Proof. Necessity of (42) follows from Lemma 2 and 3. Sufficiency can be
checked by evaluating equation (32) for the class in (42). Finally, conditions (a)
and (b) imply that utility of working is less than of not working, everything else
equal.
4.3. The Case of Zero Labor-Income Taxation
In the next step we derive a subclass of preferences from the HARA class for
which labor should not be taxed at the second-best optimum. This is a special case
when leisure is neutral.
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PROPOSITION 7. If the utility function is of the following exponential class
u(c, 1 − h) = D − φh e−c, (43)
where D is a constant, and φh =φ(h), with φ(h0)>φ(0), then the household
self-insures meaning y = 0, and the optimal labor-income tax is zero at all
dates.
Proof. Recall from Proposition 3 that when the individual takes no insurance,
the optimal wage tax is zero. In the present context, y = 0 ifπ = 1 (see equation 30).
Take limits of (42) as π → 1 (which requires setting A equal to unity) and apply
l’Hoˆpital’s rule to obtain (43).
Proposition 7 has an important implication. It basically provides a special case
where self-insurance could be optimal. Even if the insurance market is present,
households choose to self-insure (meaning the demand for insurance, y = 0) in
this special environment by using saving and labor supply as instruments.21
4.4. Why Does Normality of Leisure Mean a Positive Tax on Labor?
We have found that whether labor should be taxed or not depends on whether the
individual demands positive insurance or not, which in turn depends on whether
leisure is normal or inferior. A relationship thus exists between normality of leisure
and the insurance demand via the individual’s preferences. To see this connection
clearly, differentiate (19) with respect to τL(t), (keeping k(t) constant), to obtain
the following useful decomposition of a change in tax rate, τL(t) on work effort,
α(t):
dα(t)
dτL(t)
∣∣∣∣
k(t)
= ∂α(t)
∂τL(t)
+ ∂α(t)
∂q(t)
· ∂q(t)
∂τL(t)
. (44)
The first term in (44) represents the compensated labor-supply response when
the tax rate changes (the substitution effect). If q(t) is held constant, it follows
from (18) that ω(t) is also constant and it is straightforward to verify from (16) that
the first term is: f2/[(1−τL)f22 ·h0], and is negative. This substitution effect thus
captures the distortionary effect of the wage-income tax. As far as this substitution
effect is concerned, a higher labor tax lowers labor supply and thus lowers the tax
base.
The second term in (44) reflects the income effect of a change in the wage tax
rate, which works through the effect of τL(t) on α(t) via its effect on q(t). When
τL(t) is higher, it lowers the permanent income of the household, thus lowering
consumption in both states for given α(t). The marginal utility of consumption,
q(t), thus rises, which means ∂q(t)/∂τL(t)> 0. A loss of permanent income
(represented by higher q(t)) would boost the labor supply, α(t), if leisure is a
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normal good. Next, verify that (44) can be rewritten as:22
dα(t)
dτL(t)
∣∣∣∣
k(t)
= f2[1 − τL(t)]f22h0 −
(1 − π)f2
f22q(t)h0
∂q(t)
∂τL(t)
. (44′)
The normality of leisure (π < 1) thus makes the income effect of a higher wage
tax positive. This positive income effect tends to increase the tax base (w(t)α(t)h0)
when τL(t) rises, which countervails the distortionary effect of a higher τL(t).
The government can thus tax labor more in those economies. By contrast, if
π > 1, leisure is inferior. The income effect is then negative, reinforcing the
distortionary effect of wage taxation. In this case, the government should subsidize
labor.
4.5. Should Labor Be Taxed When the Utility Function
Is Isoelastic in Consumption?
Consider now a special case of the HARA class, equation (42), when A= 0. We
have the following lemma concerning the elasticity of interstate substitution (call
it σ hereafter).
LEMMA 4. For a specific class of HARA utility functions with A= 0, the
elasticity of interstate substitution (σ ) is given by 1 − π .
Proof. By definition,
σ =
d ln
(
c2
c1
)
d ln
(
u1c
u2c
) . (45)
Using (42) gives σ = 1 − π .
The utility function thus becomes isoelastic in consumption, and the elasticity of
interstate substitution in consumption is uniquely characterized byπ . Furthermore,
we must have π < 1 when A= 0, otherwise positive marginal utility, uc > 0, is
violated. This immediately implies that leisure is normal when the utility function
is isoelastic in consumption, and thus labor must be taxed.
To summarize, the HARA class of preferences (42) embraces a variety of utility
functions, and thus covers a wide range of optimal taxation schemes. These cases
include: (a) isoelastic utility in consumption (A= 0), in which case the optimal
labor tax is positive, (b) negative exponential utility function (π = 1), where the
optimal labor tax is zero, and (c) quadratic when π = 2 (where A> maxt c(t)), in
which case the optimal labor tax is negative (i.e., a subsidy).
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4.6. Transitional Dynamics of the Wage-Income Tax in the HARA Case
We shall now analyze the transitional dynamics of labor income tax for the range
of preferences discussed earlier. Using (29) one obtains
τL
1 − τL = (1 − π) ·
q − λ
λ − µ, (46)
then taking the time derivative of (46) using (10b), (26), and (27), one obtains
d
dt
τL
1 − τL = (1 − π)
d
dt
q − λ
λ − µ = (1 − π)(f1 −ρ)
q − µ
λ − µ. (47)
Appendix C outlines the steps in deriving the second equality. Based on the
second equality in (47), and the fact that q − µ > 0, and λ − µ > 0, we have the
following proposition.
PROPOSITION 8. If π < 1 labor is taxed (at least from the date at which the
nonconfiscation constraint does not bind), and the wage tax is increasing as long
as capital is taxed. If π = 1 labor is always untaxed. If π > 1 labor is subsidized
(at least from the date at which the nonconfiscation constraint does not bind ), and
the subsidy is increasing as long as capital is taxed.23
5. COMPARING THE LABOR TAX IN INDIVISIBLE AND DIVISIBLE
LABOR ECONOMIES
In this section, we compare the optimal tax paths of the indivisible and divisible
labor economies. We establish here in terms of an example that the optimal labor
tax paths could be very different between these two economies because of different
labor supply elasticities. The current value Hamiltonian for the household for the
divisible labor economy is
H = u(c(t), 1 − h(t)) + q(t){ρ(t)a(t) + ω(t)h(t) − c(t)}. (48)
The first-order conditions are
uc(c(t), 1 − h(t)) − q(t) = 0, (49)
u1−h(c(t), 1 − h(t)) − q(t)ω(t) = 0, (50)
q(t)ρ(t) = θq(t) − .q(t). (51)
Equations (49) through (50) form a system of equations such that c and h can be
solved in terms of q and ω. For our purpose we are interested in the compensated
labor supply response with respect to a change in ω holding q constant. We get
∂h(t)
∂ω(t)
= −uccq(t)
uccull − u2lc
> 0. (52)
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Denoting η(t) = ∂h(t)
∂ω(t)
ω(t)
h(t)
as the compensated labor supply, and assuming an
additively separable utility function, U(c, 1 − h)=V (c)+L(1 − h), Renstro¨m
(1999) shows that for this divisible labor economy, the time path of labor tax is
given by
τL
1 − τL =
q − λ
λ − µ − η
−1 · µ
λ − µ. (53)
In order to make a valid comparison between divisible and indivisible labor
economies, we need to assume the same preference structures for both. Recall
from Proposition 5 that for the indivisible laboreconomy π = 0 in (30) if and only
if the utility function is additively separable. Substituting (30), with π = 0, into
(29) gives
τL
1 − τL =
q − λ
λ − µ. (46a)
Comparing (46a) and (53), we see that the time paths of labor taxes are very
different for these two economies because of the presence of the labor-supply
elasticity term η on the right-hand side of (53).
Hansen (1985) shows that the equilibrium allocation of an indivisible labor
economy can be replicated in a divisible labor economy with a utility function
linear in leisure. From (53), this immediately means that η is infinite for such a
divisible labor economy. The optimal labor tax path described in (53) thus reduces
to the indivisible labor case (46a) in such a case. Except this special case, the
optimal paths for τL are generally different between these two economies.24
6. NO DEBT SCENARIO
Until now, we assumed that the government intertemporally balances the budget
by using public debt as an instrument. How would the optimal tax formula change
when public debt is disallowed meaning b= 0? In the absence of public debt,
the government is left only with two policy instruments, namely, wage tax and
capital tax. The zero capital tax still remains socially optimal in steady state,
which means that labor has to be always taxed to finance the exogenous stream
of government spending in the steady state. In certain cases, we may even have a
corner solution for the labor supply where the labor supply hits the upper bound
(α = 1).
The intuition for the possibility of corner solution goes as follows. To sustain
such a zero capital tax regime, the household may have to stretch the labor supply
to the upper bound (a corner solution) to finance the government spending. This
happens particularly when the household values leisure as an inferior or neutral
good. As the economy-wide capital stock grows, the household does not then
mind working harder to finance the government spending just to sustain a socially
optimal zero capital tax regime. Thus labor supply hits the corner when leisure is
nonnormal. This kind of a corner solution does not arise when debt is allowed as an
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instrument because the benevolent government can always float debt to alleviate
the strain on laborsupply.25
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the issue of optimal wage taxation in a dynamic complete-
markets setting. We find that the second-best labor tax depends crucially on the
degree of complementarity between consumption and leisure. If leisure is a not
neutral, there is scope for government intervention in the form of labor taxation or
subsidy in a complete market environment. We investigated this question in a fairly
general setting with preferences allowing nonseparability between consumption
and leisure. Our conclusion is that labor should be taxed if leisure is normal.
The optimal wage tax could be zero or negative only for very special scenarios
where leisure is nonnormal, and the government has access to public debt as a
policy instrument. If the government is restricted to balance the budget period
by period, the wage subsidy result ceases to hold. Thus, a normative theory of
taxation generally implies that labor should be taxed in the long run. We also find
that the optimal labor tax paths are generally different between the divisible and
indivisible labor economies. The results obtained here provide useful guidance in
designing optimal tax policy in a dynamic environment. A useful extension of this
paper would be to investigate similar issues in a third-best environment where the
government may not necessarily commit to a specific tax design.
NOTES
1. In the second-best, the government designs an optimal dynamic tax formula at date zero, and
remains precommitted to it (i.e., the government chooses all future consumer prices at date zero). If
lump-sum taxation is allowed, the analysis reduces to the first-best.
2. Although Chamley (1986) takes the first view of second-best taxation where the government is
just revenue raising, Judd (1985) views the government as redistributive. The zero capital-income tax
is a result robust to several generalizations. Atkeson et al. (1999) provides a survey of the robustness
of the zero capital taxation result using the primal approach. See also Renstro¨m (1999) for a survey of
the dynamic optimal tax literature using the dual approach.
3. Chamley (1985) analyzes second-best wage taxation in the absence of a capital tax and suggests
that the exact tax policy depends on the utility function. We explore this issue and show that the
functional form of the utility function is important in determining the sign of the labor-income tax.
4. There is a literature looking at this issue from various perspectives. Lucas and Stokey (1983),
and Ayagiri et al. (2002) look at optimal labor taxation in the absence of capital. For our purposes, it is
important to include physical capital. One may then explore various optimal-tax outcomes, including
the possibility of zero tax on both capital and labor. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) address the
issue of optimal labor taxation including physical and either human capital or productive government
spending. However, their analysis is mostly based on simulation with specific functional forms, and
does not admit a closed form solution with a fairly general preference structure.
5. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) include human capital in addition to physical capital, so that
the labor tax has an intertemporal distortion. They show that there are certain cases when the labor
tax is zero in steady state. See also Reinhorn (2006) for a clarification of those results, in particular
regarding interior solutions of a model with human capital in addition to physical.
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6. Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) establish that indivisible labor explains aggregate fluctua-
tions better than models with divisible labor. A subsequent literature explored further into the business
cycle implications of indivisible labor [see Greenwood and Huffman (1988), Hansen and Sargent
(1988)]. Mulligan (1999) points out that the tax implications are different for these two classes of
models.
7. A related paper, Basu, Marsiliani, and Renstro¨m (2004), derives necessary and sufficient
conditions on preferences for the capital tax to become zero in finite time in an indivisible
labor setting. Those preferences are special cases of our HARA class derived in Section 4 of this
paper.
8. This has been explored in the literature on risk sharing. There, even without a government
revenue constraint, a labor tax may be levied. The labor tax then corrects for a market failure (a
missing insurance market). In a two-period setting, Hamilton (1987) demonstrates that the optimal
wage tax is positive if the second period labor income is uncertain. The issue is indirectly dealt in
the macroeconomics literature concerning debt nonneutrality. Chan (1983) and Barsky et al. (1986),
as well as Basu (1996), examine the debt nonneutrality hypothesis when future income is uncertain.
Although none of these models explicitly deals with the labor-supply decision, there is one common
result: taxing future income at a flat rate would be welfare improving if markets were unable to fully
insure households from future income risk.
9. As expected, we find that the second-best capital-income tax is zero at the steady state.
10. The optimization problem laid out in our paper resembles Hansen (1985). We make it explicit
that the agent starts with the same asset but potentially can transit to two possible states: work or no-
work. In equilibrium, they will, however, have the same asset equation via insuring themselves against
income risk. Alternatively, we can transform the problem into a single state variable by defining
a = αa1(t) + (1 − α)a2(t), and get exactly the same first-order conditions.
11. The household randomizes the labor-supply decision in this setting by choosing a probability
of work α(t). A realistic description of this arrangement is that the representative household consists
of a family of N members. In each period, the household decides the proportion, α(t), of members
working. The labor supply is then α(t)h0N . The household can buy insurance on a competitive market
to diversify the income uncertainty arising from (1 −α(t))N of its members not working. After
choosing the probability of work, α(t) the household is precommitted to it, and cannot renege. The
insurance company then charges the actuarially fair premium, 1 −α. This rules out adverse selection in
the model. The household then realizes that, when choosing work probability, the insurance premium
is a linear function of the probability.
12. Note that if the utility function is nonseparable, then the household optimally chooses not to
have full consumption insurance. One can easily set up a social planning problem and demonstrate
that no other consumption allocation dominates the allocation governed by (12).
13. One needs to be careful about the non-negativity constraint on consumption while thinking
about negative unemployment benefit. y(t) can be negative as long as c2(t) is nonnegative. We assume
interior solutions, meaning c2(t)> 0.
14. We assume no-Ponzi games.
15. In a divisible labor economy, Renstro¨m (1999) finds that noninferiority of leisure is sufficient
for the wage-income tax to be positive. In the indivisible-labor setting, normality is both necessary and
sufficient for a positive labor-income tax.
16. The insurance market is added to obtain insights about the relationship between normality
of leisure and the optimal tax, as well as deriving preference structures for which leisure is normal.
One can alternatively construct an environment with contingent-claims markets as in Shell and Wright
(1993), and derive the same equilibrium allocation as a sunspot equilibrium. A proof of this equivalence
is available from the authors on request.
17. No such confiscation constraint is relevant for labor income taxation because if labor income
is confiscated by the government it is optimal for the household to set α(t)= 0, which means no
production. By contrast, the capital income can be confiscated and the government can eventually own
all the capital to run production.
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18. It is straightforward to verify that for given k and q, α′(τL)< 0 and hence α(·) can be inverted
with respect to τL.
19. To see this clearly note that the proof of Proposition 3 rests on the fact that ′(q)= −y/qh0,
which holds when y is nonzero.
20. Note that π = 0 cannot be nested under this case, which means additively separable utility
function does not belong to our derived class of preferences.
21. In general, savings alone would not equalize marginal utilities across states. To see this clearly,
note that in the absence of an insurance market, there is no equation (8), and hence (9) will not hold
generally. Thus, savings alone cannot equalize marginal utilities across states. If the insurance market
is dropped, the model reduces to an incomplete market scenario where the intertemporal marginal
rates of substitution in consumption (which is governed by the two co-state variables q1 and q2 in our
model) will not be equalized across states because of the emergence of uninsurable income risk. This
uninsurable risk arises because a fraction of the households do not work.
22. To see this, insert (30) into (A.5) and use (16) to obtain ∂α(t)/∂q(t)= −(1 − π)f2/f22q(t)
h0.
23. When π = 1, it turns out that the nonconfiscation constraint is binding for a period t ∈ [0, T ∗),
and capital income is taxed at 100%. From T ∗ and onward, capital is untaxed, and the economy is at
its steady state level. T ∗ is a function of the present value of the stream of gt , t ∈ [0,∞) discounted at
the rate θ .
24. One suspects that in general the optimal labor tax is lower in an indivisible labor economy
because of a higher labor supply elasticity. In order to make such a quantitative comparison, we need
to solve the differential equations in λ, q and µ in both economies. Although differential equations
look the same for both economies, the solution will be different. The reason is that the initial values
of these co-state variables are different for these two economies (except the special case when η is
infinite), and also the time from which the nonconfiscation constraint does not bind also will differ.
The details of these derivations are available from the authors on request.
25. The details of the derivation of the zero debt case are available from the authors on request.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that leisure in an indivisible labor economy is normal
if ∂α(t)
∂a0
< 0, which means the household chooses a lower probability of work when its wealth
is higher. Next observe that
∂α(t)
∂a0
= ∂α(t)
∂q(t)
· ∂q(t)
∂a0
. (A.1)
Using (10a), one obtains
∂q(t)
∂a0
= exp
(∫ ∞
0
(θ − ρ(s)) ds
)
· ∂q0
∂a0
. (A.2)
Next note by the application of Envelope property of the value function J (a0) in (1) that
J ′(a0) = q0. By strict concavity of the value function (J ′′(a0) < 0), it follows that ∂q0∂a0 < 0.
Thus from (A.2), it follows that ∂q(t)
∂a0
< 0. From (A.1), it means that
sign
(
∂α(t)
∂a0
)
= −sign
(
∂α(t)
∂q(t)
)
. (A.3)
Using (12) and (16), define the following implicit function (time indices suppressed)
G(q, α) = U(c1(q), 1−h0)−U(c2(q), 1)+q ·(1 − τL) · f2(k, αh0)h0 + c2(q) − c1(q).
(A.4)
Using the implicit function theorem and (9) one obtains
∂α(t)
∂q(t)
= −Gq
Gα
= − y(t)
q(t)(1 − τL(t))f22 · h20
. (A.5)
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From (A.3) and (A.5), it follows that ∂α(t)
∂a0
is negative, zero, or positive if and only y(t)
is positive, negative, or zero.
APPENDIX B
Proof of Proposition 2. Plugging (12) into (23) and using (11), one obtains
f2 − ω = (q − λ)y
(λ − µ)h0 . (B.1)
Premultiply (24) by q and exploiting the fact that ′(q) = [c1 − c2 − ωh0]/qh0, one
obtains
qψ˙ = qρψ+(λ − q) [α c1q q + (1 − α) c2q q] + µα[ωh0 − c1 + c2]. (B.2)
Next note that
d
dt
(ψq) = ψ˙q + ψq˙ = ψ˙q + ψ(θ − ρ)q. (B.3)
Plugging (B.3) into (B.2) gives
d
dt
(ψq) = θψq + (λ − q) [α c1q q + (1 − α) c2q q] + µα [ωh0 − c1 + c2] . (B.4)
Next note that
d
dt
(µa) = µ˙a + µa˙. (B.5)
Plugging (27) into (B.5)
d
dt
(µa) = µ(θ − ρ)a + µa˙. (B.6)
Using (2), (3), and (10a), the household’s budget constraint can be rewritten as
a˙ = ρa + αωh0 − αc1 − (1 − α)c2, (B.7)
which after plugging into (B.6) gives
d
dt
(µa) = θµa + µ[αωh0 − αc1 − (1 − α)c2]. (B.8)
Next noting that a = b + k, rewrite (25) as
ν = ψq − µa. (B.9)
Taking the time derivative of (B.9), one obtains
ν˙ = d
dt
(ψq) − d
dt
(µa). (B.10)
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Using (B.4) and (B.8) in (B.10) one obtains
.
ν = θν + (λ − q) [α c1q q + (1 − α) c2q q] + µc2. (B.11)
Chamley (1986) shows that the confiscation constraint, (20) cannot be binding forever.
In our case, if it is binding forever, consumption falls to zero in both states. Suppose that
it ceases to bind at date t1. Because ν is the multiplier associated with the confiscation
constraint, (20), this implies that
ν(t) = ν˙(t) = 0, (B.12)
for t ≥ t1. Plugging (B.12) into (B.11) and simplifying terms, we get
q − λ
µ
= c
2[
αc1qq + (1 − α)c2qq
] , (B.13)
for t ≥ t1.
Plugging (B.13) into (B.1), one obtains
λ − µ
−µ (f2 − ω) =
−c2y[
α c1q q + (1 − α) c2q q
]
h0
. (B.14)
Because λ> 0 and µ< 0 and c1q < 0, and c2q < 0 (by concavity of u), it follows that
the sign of (f2 − ω) is the same as the sign of y. Hence, the labor income tax is positive
(negative) when y > (<) 0. 
APPENDIX C
Derivation of equation (36): Inverting (38) gives
uscc
/
usc = −1/[A + (1 − π)cs], (C.1)
for s = {1, 2}. Or equivalently
d ln
(
usc
)
dcs
= − 1
1 − π
d ln(A + (1 − π)cs)
dcs
. (C.2)
Integrating both sides with respect to cs gives
ln
(
usc
) = Ms − 11 − π ln(A + (1 − π) cs), (C.3)
where Ms is any constant, possibly dependent on s.
Taking exponents of both sides gives
us
c = Bs(A + (1 − π) cs )−1/(1−π), (C.4)
where Bs = exp(Ms), and consequently is positive.
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Integrating both sides with respect to cs finally gives
us = Ds −B
s
π
(A + (1 − π) cs )−π/(1−π), (C.5)
where Ds is any constant, possibly dependent on s.
Derivation of equation (46). Note that
d
dt
[
q − λ
λ − µ
]
=
[
(dq/dt) − (dλ/dt)
λ − µ
]
−
[
q − λ
λ − µ
]
.
[
(dλ/dt) − (dµ/dt)
λ − µ
]
. (C.6)
Next plug in (10b), (26), and (27) into the right-hand side of (C.6) to obtain (47).
